SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

IN THE SU	PREME	COURT	OF.	THE	ONT.LED	STATES
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DAMIAN MCELRATH,)	
	Petit	cioner	,)	
v.) No. 2	22-721
GEORGIA,)	
	Respo	ondent.)	

Pages: 1 through 68

Place: Washington, D.C.

Date: November 28, 2023

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1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES	
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3	DAMIAN MCELRATH,)	
4	Petitioner,)	
5	v.) No. 22-721	
6	GEORGIA,)	
7	Respondent.)	
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9		
10	Washington, D.C.	
11	Tuesday, November 28, 2023	
12		
13	The above-entitled matter came on for	
14	oral argument before the Supreme Court of the	
15	United States at 10:03 a.m.	
16		
17	APPEARANCES:	
18	RICHARD A. SIMPSON, ESQUIRE, Washington, D.C.;	or
19	behalf of the Petitioner.	
20	STEPHEN J. PETRANY, Solicitor General, Atlanta,	
21	Georgia; on behalf of the Respondent.	
22		
23		
24		
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(10:03 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear
4	argument first this morning in Case 22-721,
5	McElrath versus Georgia.
6	Mr. Simpson.
7	ORAL ARGUMENT OF RICHARD A. SIMPSON
8	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
9	MR. SIMPSON: Mr. Chief Justice, and
10	may it please the Court:
11	The most fundamental principle of
12	double jeopardy law, going back hundreds of
13	years before even the adoption of the
14	Constitution, is that if a jury in a court with
15	jurisdiction returns a verdict of acquittal,
16	that that verdict is final. It may not be
17	the defendant may not be subjected to a second
18	prosecution ever, no questions, end of
19	discussion.
20	This case is the paradigm in which
21	that example applies or that principle applies.
22	Mr. McElrath went to trial before a jury in
23	Georgia. The jury found him not guilty of
24	malice murder by reason of insanity. No one has
) E	anastioned that that jumn deliberated in

- 1 accordance with Georgia processes. It returned
- 2 a verdict in return -- in accordance with
- 3 Georgia processes. The State and the defendant
- 4 both affirmatively indicated they had no
- 5 objection to the form of the verdict. The court
- 6 accepted it and entered judgment. Accordingly,
- 7 that is the end of it as far as the malice
- 8 murder charge is concerned.
- 9 The State contends that Mr. McElrath
- 10 can be subjected to a second trial because that
- 11 acquittal is repugnant to a conviction on
- 12 separate offenses. And this Court's analysis
- has always been offense by offense. He was
- found quilty but mentally ill as to felony
- murder and guilty but mentally ill as to
- 16 aggravated assault. This repugnant verdict
- 17 exception to the double jeopardy principle does
- 18 not stand, cannot withstand analysis.
- 19 The State really makes two arguments.
- 20 The first is that this Court's inconsistent
- 21 verdict cases do not apply because of their --
- there's a difference between a repugnant verdict
- and an inconsistent verdict and, in particular,
- 24 that with a repugnant verdict, there is no
- 25 uncertainty as to what the jury did.

1 That is wrong as a factual matter 2 because the uncertainty is the same, but, more importantly, it does not matter because an 3 acquittal is final regardless. There -- it does 4 not matter why the jury reached that conclusion. 5 The acquittal is final and conclusive. 6 7 I welcome the Court's questions. JUSTICE THOMAS: So your client filed 8 a motion to vacate the -- the conviction as 9 repugnant. What is the effect when -- when a 10 11 verdict is determined to be repugnant? What's 12 the effect of that? MR. SIMPSON: Well, this Court has 13 14 held in --15 JUSTICE THOMAS: No, I mean in the 16 Georgia court. 17 MR. SIMPSON: In Georgia? In Georgia, 18 before this case -- and the Turner case in the 19 Georgia Supreme Court was -- is the leading example -- the acquittal would stand and the 20 conviction would be vacated. 21 2.2 In this case, the Georgia Supreme Court for the first time held that both the 23 acquittal and the conviction should be vacated. 24 25 JUSTICE THOMAS: I think the -- if I

- 1 understand the opinion below correctly, the
- 2 Georgia Supreme Court says that because of the
- 3 repugnancy there was no verdict. And that's
- 4 what I'm trying to understand.
- 5 If you -- if -- with respect to your
- 6 motion earlier, was it your goal, was the
- 7 argument that the verdict was void because it
- 8 was repugnant or simply that it should be
- 9 vacated because it was repugnant?
- 10 MR. SIMPSON: Our argument was that
- 11 the conviction should be vacated -- the
- 12 convictions should be vacated because they were
- 13 repugnant. Neither side in -- in McElrath I
- 14 raised any question about the acquittal
- 15 standing. So, on appeal, we argued to the
- 16 Georgia Supreme Court you should throw out the
- 17 conviction. But neither side argued that the
- 18 acquittal was in question.
- 19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, as a
- 20 general matter, do you agree that it's a matter
- of state law when jeopardy terminates? Because
- 22 that's the -- that's the -- that's the basic
- 23 question, right, whether the defendant is being
- 24 put in jeopardy more than once. So you have to
- 25 have the first jeopardy terminate before you can

- 1 get to the question of whether or not he's in
- 2 jeopardy a second time. As a general matter, is
- 3 that a question of state law?
- 4 MR. SIMPSON: As a general matter,
- 5 yes, Mr. Chief Justice, but that is subject to
- 6 this Court making the ultimate determination as
- 7 to what constitutes an acquittal. This Court
- 8 has held that jeopardy terminates when there is
- 9 an acquittal. And so, within broad ranges, the
- state has discretion, subject to constitutional
- 11 limitations, due process, speedy trial, et
- 12 cetera, to set procedures.
- 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What if one of
- 14 the procedures is that the verdict form has to
- 15 be signed by the jury foreman, okay, and the
- jury reaches a verdict, you know, 12 -- 12 to
- 17 nothing or whatever, that the defendant is not
- 18 guilty, but the jury foreman, you know, as he's
- 19 presenting the verdict or whatever, decides, you
- 20 know -- you know, I'm not -- I have second
- 21 thoughts, I'm not going to sign it? So, as a
- 22 matter of state law, does that verdict terminate
- 23 the first jeopardy or not?
- MR. SIMPSON: No, because that -- the
- 25 signing of the verdict is a procedural

- 1 requirement and the state is -- is free to
- 2 enforce that procedural requirement.
- 3 The difference here -- and the Georgia
- 4 Supreme Court opinions acknowledge this -- is
- 5 that there was not one verdict; there were
- 6 verdicts. No one questions there were verdicts.
- 7 And to determine that that verdict was void, the
- 8 -- the -- the acquittal, the Georgia Supreme
- 9 Court looked at the acquittal, looked at the
- 10 conviction, compared the two after the fact, and
- 11 concluded that they were repugnant and,
- 12 therefore, declared them to be void.
- 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So you would
- say the question before us is whether Georgia as
- 15 a matter of state law can say that a verdict --
- that jeopardy has not terminated until, for
- 17 example, they determine that the verdicts are
- 18 not repugnant?
- 19 They draw a distinction between
- inconsistent verdicts, on which, of course, we
- 21 already have established law, and repugnant
- 22 verdicts. So, I mean, what if they have a
- 23 system where, once the jury has reached a
- 24 verdict, it's not effective for a week to give
- 25 the jurors a chance to ponder it a little bit

- 1 more, for the -- whatever reason? When would
- 2 jeopardy terminate in that case?
- 3 MR. SIMPSON: The issue there, Mr.
- 4 Chief Justice, would -- would focus on I would
- 5 say due process in particular as to those
- 6 procedures by which the verdict needed to be
- 7 returned. What the state can't do --
- 8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but what
- 9 -- I asked about what the state did. Is that
- 10 something they can do?
- 11 MR. SIMPSON: What they --
- 12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: In other
- words, say, yes, the jury has determined, you
- know, not guilty, but, under state law, that's
- 15 not effective for another week.
- MR. SIMPSON: Well, no. Once -- once
- 17 the --
- 18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And in that
- interim, of course, the juror dies or, you know
- 20 --
- MR. SIMPSON: No, no. Once -- I -- I
- 22 -- I apologize. Once -- once the verdict has
- 23 been returned -- this Court's cases, including
- 24 Ball going back to 1896, would hold, once the
- 25 verdict has been returned, that's what

- 1 terminates jeopardy.
- 2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Okay. So --
- 3 well, let's say Georgia says that's not the
- 4 verdict; that is the preliminary determination.
- 5 So they turn into the court and now it's here.
- 6 Our preliminary determination is unanimous, that
- 7 -- not guilty. And under Georgia law, that is a
- 8 preliminary determination. It becomes the
- 9 verdict after one week.
- 10 MR. SIMPSON: It -- it -- it would be,
- 11 I believe, a due process question as to whether
- 12 that procedure pass -- passes muster. The
- 13 procedural aspects, the state has broad
- 14 discretion. What they can't do is make a
- 15 decision based on the content so that any --
- 16 JUSTICE JACKSON: And is that because
- 17 it's a matter of federal law? I mean, I quess I
- don't understand your response to the Chief
- 19 Justice's first question, which was, is this
- 20 question of when something is an acquittal a
- 21 matter of state law or federal law?
- 22 And I had understood it to be a
- 23 federal question such that when we looked at
- 24 due -- double jeopardy in prior cases, I'm
- 25 thinking about Blueford versus Arkansas, for

```
1
      example --
 2
                MR. SIMPSON:
                              Yes.
 3
                JUSTICE JACKSON: -- we evaluated it
      as a matter of federal law, correct?
 4
                MR. SIMPSON: Well, ultimately, this
 5
 6
      Court determines what constitutes an acquittal.
7
      So, for example, Blueford is -- is an example of
      a case in which the jury failed to reach a
 8
      verdict.
 9
                JUSTICE JACKSON: So no matter --
10
11
                MR. SIMPSON: But --
12
                JUSTICE JACKSON: -- what label the
13
      state puts on it, if the label -- you know,
14
      the -- the -- the state can have all kinds of
15
      procedures and it can say, well, you know, we're
16
      going to say that this particular result is not
17
      an acquittal.
18
                We've held, I thought, that it's sort
19
      of a functional analysis and that as a matter of
20
      federal law, we look at what happened and
21
      determine what counts as an -- as an acquittal.
2.2
                MR. SIMPSON: Exactly, Justice
```

Supreme Court had characterized the granting of

a demurrer as not an acquittal. This -- this

In Smalis, this case, the Pennsylvania

23

24

- 1 Court held that it was an acquittal.
- 2 Similarly, in Evans, Michigan had held
- 3 that the ruling by the court in a -- in a case
- 4 in which the judge mistakenly thought there was
- 5 an additional element was not an acquittal.
- 6 This Court held it's an acquittal.
- 7 The definition of acquittal, just last
- 8 term in the Smith case, this Court defined what
- 9 an acquittal is, and that is a determination, a
- 10 resolution of criminal culpability. So that --
- 11 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, to pick up on
- 12 that --
- 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but --
- JUSTICE ALITO: I'm sorry.
- 15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Sorry.
- JUSTICE ALITO: To pick up on that,
- 17 Mr. Simpson, it's my understanding that there
- 18 are jurisdictions in which the rule is that if a
- 19 jury returns an inconsistent verdict or some
- 20 subcategory of a inconsistent verdict, the
- 21 proper procedure for the trial judge is to
- instruct the jury, you can't do that, your
- verdicts are irreconcilable, go back and
- 24 deliberate some more.
- Is that your understanding too?

```
1
                MR. SIMPSON: I'm not aware of a state
 2
      that does that. Our -- our -- our position
 3
      would be that -- that that would violate the
 4
     Double Jeopardy Clause. But, of course, you
     don't need to reach that here because the
 5
 6
     verdict was accepted, but --
 7
                JUSTICE ALITO: Well, I -- I believe
      -- and I stand ready to be corrected if I'm
 8
9
     wrong -- but that's the rule in Missouri, Kansas
10
11
               MR. SIMPSON: It -- it --
12
               JUSTICE ALITO: -- Arizona.
               MR. SIMPSON: I -- I -- it --
13
14
                JUSTICE ALITO: So let's assume that
      that's -- that does not violate double jeopardy.
15
16
                If we were to hold that it does, then
17
     our decision here would have implications beyond
     Georgia. Assume that that's -- that that is the
18
19
     rule.
20
                MR. SIMPSON: Yes.
21
                JUSTICE ALITO: If that is the rule,
22
      then would it be a violation of double jeopardy
23
      for this to occur? The judge violates -- the
24
      trial judge violates state law, accepts the
      inconsistent verdicts, and accepts the
25
```

- 1 conviction on one count, acquittal on the other
- 2 count. One of the parties says, no, you
- 3 violated state law. There's an appeal. And the
- 4 state supreme court says, no, this was a
- 5 violation of state law, go back and retry both
- 6 counts.
- 7 MR. SIMPSON: Once the verdicts had --
- 8 JUSTICE ALITO: Would you draw a
- 9 distinction between those two situations?
- 10 MR. SIMPSON: I -- I -- I would
- 11 draw -- draw a distinction. And -- and I
- 12 believe you're correct that Missouri does follow
- that process, or at least I've seen a case in
- 14 which they did that.
- 15 The difference would be that once the
- verdict has been accepted, then going up on --
- on appeal, it could not be challenged, for much
- 18 the same reasons that in the -- in the Evans
- 19 case, notwithstanding that the judge guite
- 20 explicitly based his decision on an element of
- 21 the crime that didn't exist, this Court
- 22 nonetheless held that's binding once that
- 23 verdict was accepted.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, that seems to
- 25 make the rule that you're asking us for, you

- 1 know, pretty insignificant, right, if -- if we
- 2 come out of this case and it turns out that when
- 3 the jury form is given to the judge, the judge
- 4 can look at it and say, no, I don't think so,
- 5 that looks inconsistent, that looks repugnant,
- 6 whatever word you want to put on it, go back and
- 7 try it again.
- 8 You know, then -- then, in the next
- 9 case, the judge is just going to do that, and so
- 10 this will be a one-case only sort of ruling.
- 11 MR. SIMPSON: And, Justice Kagan, that
- is not our position. Our position is that once
- the jury returns the verdict, that that double
- jeopardy protection is triggered, that the
- 15 jeopardy has ended.
- I wanted to make the point that
- there's a distinction, that's not what happened
- 18 here, but we believe that once the jury has
- 19 returned the verdict and there is an acquittal,
- that's the end of it. The judge may not send it
- 21 back.
- Now that doesn't have to be decided in
- this case.
- 24 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, do you have -- I
- mean, you argue that a state can't take what's

- 1 really an acquittal and put some other label on
- 2 it --
- 3 MR. SIMPSON: Yes.
- 4 JUSTICE ALITO: -- and say no, there
- 5 wasn't an acquittal. But do you have any -- any
- 6 double jeopardy precedent from this Court or,
- 7 for that matter, from lower federal courts
- 8 saying that a state cannot have a procedure like
- 9 the Missouri procedure?
- 10 MR. SIMPSON: The repugnant -- oh, the
- 11 --
- 12 JUSTICE ALITO: A state can't have a
- rule that says a trial judge is not to accept
- 14 inconsistent verdicts --
- MR. SIMPSON: I am not --
- 16 JUSTICE ALITO: -- or repugnant
- 17 verdicts. That's a violation of double
- 18 jeopardy.
- 19 MR. SIMPSON: I -- I -- I'm not aware
- of a case directly on point on that issue. The
- 21 principle, I think, would be the same as -- as
- 22 raised here.
- 23 JUSTICE ALITO: Another related
- 24 question. This is my other point of concern
- 25 about this case. You seem to agree in your

- 1 reply brief or at least you don't contest the
- 2 proposition that if a jury returns inconsistent
- 3 verdicts or repugnant verdicts on the same
- 4 count, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
- 5 prohibit the judge from saying, no, you can't do
- 6 that, go back and deliberate some more.
- 7 Is that a violation -- is that
- 8 correct, that's not a violation of double
- 9 jeopardy?
- 10 MR. SIMPSON: If -- if, in your -- in
- 11 your hypothetical, from those inconsistent
- 12 verdicts one cannot ascertain whether there has
- been an acquittal or a conviction, then we
- 14 believe that is distinguishable.
- 15 And going back to your earlier
- 16 question, going back again to 1896 and Ball,
- 17 this Court did hold that the return of the
- 18 verdict terminated jeopardy, notwithstanding
- 19 that the indictment was -- was invalid
- 20 ultimately. So I think that is -- is close to
- 21 on point.
- JUSTICE ALITO: So --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Did --
- JUSTICE ALITO: -- what principle
- 25 distinguishes -- one more question along these

- 1 lines. What principle distinguishes the
- 2 situation where there are inconsistent jury
- 3 determinations on one count from the situation
- 4 where there are logically irreconcilable jury
- 5 determinations on two counts?
- I -- I don't -- maybe there's a
- 7 principle that explains that. Other than a --
- 8 a -- a formal difference, I don't really -- it
- 9 doesn't jump out at me why that should be
- 10 different.
- 11 MR. SIMPSON: The -- the difference,
- 12 Justice Alito, is that double jeopardy has
- always been analyzed on an offense-by-offense
- 14 basis. So the question is -- is, was there a
- 15 verdict on the particular offense?
- And if what the jury returns does not
- show that there has been a verdict, you can't
- 18 tell what the jury determined, then it's
- 19 appropriate to ask them to delay -- deliberate
- 20 further.
- 21 What -- what the Court can't do in
- that circumstance is to look at the content of
- two verdicts and say we're going to compare the
- 24 jury's findings on this count with its findings
- on this separate offense and based on an

```
1 analysis of the contents --
```

- 2 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Is there a -- is
- 3 there a logical principle, though, that explains
- 4 that, other than you just said it's always been
- 5 that way?
- 6 MR. SIMPSON: In -- in terms of,
- 7 Justice Kavanaugh, in terms of?
- 8 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Offense-by-offense
- 9 versus, as Justice Alito says, one count.
- 10 MR. SIMPSON: Yes. Historically, each
- offense was brought in a separate indictment.
- 12 This Court held I believe in Dunn that when you
- 13 have a multi-count indictment, it's still an
- offense-by-offense. And the logical principle,
- 15 it's a different crime.
- 16 JUSTICE GORSUCH: I -- I -- I --
- 17 MR. SIMPSON: Each count is a
- 18 different crime, so, here --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- I had thought --
- 20 I had thought the distinction was -- was rather
- 21 more simple than that. I -- I had one of those
- 22 cases on the Tenth Circuit where the jury --
- MR. SIMPSON: Yes, Shippley.
- 24 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- the jury came
- 25 back on one count and said guilty and not

- 1 guilty.
- 2 MR. SIMPSON: Yes.
- 3 JUSTICE GORSUCH: And the judge said,
- 4 I -- well, I don't know what to do.
- 5 MR. SIMPSON: Yes.
- 6 JUSTICE GORSUCH: You've not returned
- 7 a verdict of acquittal. You've -- you've also
- 8 returned a verdict of guilty.
- 9 MR. SIMPSON: Yes.
- 10 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Go back and figure
- 11 this out, folks. And -- and that seems to me a
- world away from a verdict on any count that says
- this individual is not guilty in the eyes of his
- 14 peers.
- 15 MR. SIMPSON: Exactly, Justice
- 16 Gorsuch. And -- and the opinion you wrote in
- the Shippley case didn't reach the double
- 18 jeopardy issue.
- 19 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Oh, I was -- I took
- 20 care not to come close to this case.
- 21 (Laughter.)
- 22 MR. SIMPSON: I -- I -- I -- you
- 23 did say it about three times.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: How -- how --

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1
               JUSTICE JACKSON: And isn't -- isn't
 2
 3
               JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- how -- how can
 4
      a --
 5
               JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- about four times.
 6
               JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- how can a
7
      defendant be both sane and insane?
               MR. SIMPSON: It cannot be.
8
               JUSTICE JACKSON: But -- but isn't the
 9
     principle that we have juries that are -- their
10
11
      decision-making is sort of inviolate? In other
12
     words --
13
               MR. SIMPSON: Yes.
14
               JUSTICE JACKSON: -- the jury can
15
     nullify on a particular decision. We don't go
16
     back and try to figure out the jury's thinking
17
     with respect to inconsistent verdicts across
18
     different counts --
19
               MR. SIMPSON: Yes.
               JUSTICE JACKSON: -- because they can
20
21
     do whatever they want. That has been sort of a
22
      time immemorial principle with respect to jury
23
     deliberations, right?
               MR. SIMPSON: Yes, Justice Jackson,
24
25
      and that's exactly why we propose this test of
```

2.2

- 1 looking at the contents. What the State can't
- 2 do and what -- what it is -- is seeking to do
- 3 here is to look at the contents of the jury's
- 4 findings on two different crimes and say we're
- 5 going to compare those after the fact and throw
- 6 out the acquittal.
- 7 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: But how is it
- 8 different from Justice Gorsuch's question to say
- 9 the defendant's both guilty and not guilty, and
- 10 then, in the next case, the jury says the
- 11 defendant's both sane and not sane?
- 12 MR. SIMPSON: The difference is that
- 13 those verdicts in the second example are on
- 14 separate offenses. And so it's like -- it's no
- 15 different than one of the cases this Court has
- 16 dealt with, the defendant is convicted of
- 17 conspiracy to possess cocaine but acquitted of
- 18 possession of cocaine. That's impossible.
- 19 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Right.
- 20 MR. SIMPSON: No different from a
- 21 repugnant verdict. It -- that can't be right,
- 22 but this Court has consistently held you can't
- look at it after the fact.
- 24 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And we allow -- I
- 25 guess the principle, we allow juries to

- 1 compromise in ways that are maybe not completely
- 2 logical, but when it gets down to one count,
- 3 they can't do guilty and not guilty. That's not
- 4 an acceptable compromise, is that --
- 5 MR. SIMPSON: Well, exactly, in the
- 6 sense that they haven't --
- 7 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: That's not even a
- 8 compromise at all.
- 9 MR. SIMPSON: -- they haven't rendered
- 10 a verdict on the charge.
- 11 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Yeah.
- MR. SIMPSON: So, here, for example,
- the charge is malice murder. If they come back
- and say guilty and not guilty, you don't know
- 15 what the jury did.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Right.
- 17 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You seem to have
- 18 accepted a premise -- you seem to have accepted
- 19 a premise that I'm doubtful about, which is you
- 20 can't be insane on one count and not insane on
- 21 another. But malice murder has a different mens
- rea than assault, correct?
- MR. SIMPSON: It does, yes.
- 24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And so you can be
- 25 not guilty by reason of insanity with respect to

2.4

- 1 a malice murder because you have to be able to
- 2 have mental capacity enough to form that intent,
- 3 but that's different than the assault intent,
- 4 correct? The assault intent only requires you
- 5 to injure. And this man could have had that.
- 6 He was delusional -- delusional about the
- 7 reasons he was causing pain, but he knew he was
- 8 causing pain, correct?
- 9 MR. SIMPSON: The -- the elements of
- 10 the charges are different. And under Georgia
- 11 procedure, though, the State had to prove the
- 12 elements of each of those crimes to obtain --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: What I'm saying is
- 14 they're not necessarily --
- MR. SIMPSON: On these -- on these --
- 16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- you're buying
- 17 the other side's argument that --
- 18 MR. SIMPSON: On these facts, we
- 19 believe that the -- the -- that they are, in
- 20 fact, inconsistent repugnant verdicts because
- 21 insanity is an affirmative defense in Georgia,
- 22 the defendant has to prove it by a preponderance
- of the evidence, and, here, there was one single
- 24 episode.
- Now, on different facts -- and, in

- 1 fact, the Georgia Supreme Court in -- in
- 2 McElrath talks about a different case in which
- 3 you could be sane -- a defendant could be sane
- 4 and insane at -- at different times. I believe
- 5 that one was shooting one person and then going
- 6 down the hall --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Yeah.
- 8 MR. SIMPSON: -- and shooting a
- 9 different person. But, here, it -- it --
- 10 because the issue is the affirmative defense,
- it's exactly the same as to the three charges.
- The point again, though, is the jury
- 13 can go back -- can nullify, and we don't know
- 14 why they did what they did. It could just --
- the uncertainty is the same. We don't know why
- they found him sane on one count and insane on
- the other, just like we don't know why the jury
- 18 convicted on possession with intent to sell but
- 19 not on possession.
- 20 And, Justice Jackson, your point's
- 21 exactly right, you can't go back and -- and --
- 22 and question that. Once the jury comes back and
- 23 says not guilty, that's the end of it. And the
- 24 different --
- JUSTICE BARRETT: But what are --

- 1 counsel, what are the limits on that? Because
- 2 the states can set some procedural parameters,
- 3 right?
- 4 MR. SIMPSON: Absolutely.
- 5 JUSTICE BARRETT: So what if there was
- 6 a rule that said, listen, if a jury -- if this
- 7 has gone on, deliberation's gone on for more
- 8 than two days, automatically it's a mistrial?
- 9 MR. SIMPSON: Yeah.
- 10 JUSTICE BARRETT: And then, at the --
- 11 at the very beginning -- or let -- let me make
- it hours so it works better -- say, six hours,
- it's automatically a mistrial, and then, at six
- 14 hours and 10 minutes, the jury returns a verdict
- 15 of acquittal.
- 16 Does that count as a mistrial where
- 17 jeopardy doesn't --
- MR. SIMPSON: Well, what -- what --
- 19 what the Court has held, this Court has held, is
- 20 that in the mistrial context, it -- there has to
- 21 be management --
- JUSTICE BARRETT: Well, no, I
- 23 understand the rule about mistrial, but I guess
- 24 what I'm saying is there, you know, the judge
- just waits, but the rule says, you know, at six

2.7

- 1 hours, it's a line, it's a mistrial, but the
- 2 jury does still come back and return a verdict
- 3 of acquittal. It's just that it violates this
- 4 procedural requirement.
- 5 Which side of the line does that fall
- on? I mean, the jury's returned a verdict of
- 7 acquittal, but state law says it just doesn't
- 8 count if the jury's deliberated for more than
- 9 six hours.
- 10 MR. SIMPSON: Well, one of the
- interests protected by the Double Jeopardy
- 12 Clause is the defendant's right to have a
- decision by the jury that's empaneled. And so I
- 14 think the question would be, is a six-hour
- period that automatically triggers a mistrial so
- 16 unreasonable that it, in fact, violates double
- 17 jeopardy?
- 18 I -- I would think it would. It's a
- 19 judgment call as to how long. But that would be
- 20 the issue. Can a state deprive the defendant of
- 21 his right, her right, to have a decision by the
- 22 particular jury that was empaneled?
- JUSTICE BARRETT: So what kinds of
- 24 procedural requirements can a state impose?
- MR. SIMPSON: They have very broad

2.8

- discretion, as I said, subject to due process
- 2 and right to jury trial, et cetera, but
- 3 evidentiary, we don't -- if you look at the
- 4 amicus brief here, we don't question evidentiary
- 5 rule -- rules can be set. Does the -- all of
- 6 the jurors sign the form or just the foreperson?
- 7 Do you poll the jury? Hours that are
- 8 deliberated? All of those procedural points.
- 9 And the test that we think captures it
- 10 is looking at the contents, and that -- that's
- 11 the red line that the State crossed here, is
- 12 that they acknowledged -- the Georgia Supreme
- 13 Court acknowledged it had two verdicts in front
- of it, no question. It had -- Justice Pinson in
- 15 his concurrence dubitante pointed out it's a
- 16 fiction, it's a legal fiction here, that we have
- 17 two verdicts and we're going to look at the
- 18 content, compare them and, based on that
- 19 comparison, refuse to honor a jury verdict.
- 20 We're not aware of -- of any other
- 21 state that allows that, and we think it's a
- 22 clear-cut violation of double jeopardy.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: Thank you.
- 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
- 25 counsel.

1	Justice Thomas?
2	Justice Alito?
3	Justice Gorsuch?
4	Justice Jackson?
5	Okay. Thank you, counsel.
6	MR. SIMPSON: Thank you.
7	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: General
8	Petrany.
9	ORAL ARGUMENT OF STEPHEN J. PETRANY
10	ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
11	MR. PETRANY: Mr. Chief Justice, and
12	may it please the Court:
13	Petitioner Damian McElrath assumes
14	again and again that there was a verdict in this
15	case, but that's simply not true according to
16	state law as determined by Georgia's highest
17	court. Under Georgia's narrow, sensible
18	repugnancy rule, a jury cannot issue special
19	affirmative findings that facially contradict
20	each other. These incoherent, contradictory
21	statements do not constitute a verdict in the
22	first place. They don't resolve the factual
23	inquiry.
24	In practice, this rule means a jury
25	cannot declare a man both sane and insane at the

1 exact same time with respect to the exact same 2 act, as the jury purported to do here. why the Georgia Supreme Court held there was no 3 verdict, no acquittal, and no convictions. 4 McElrath does not challenge that 5 6 underlying Georgia Supreme Court decision, 7 which, of course, benefited him, and he doesn't 8 explain why we should ignore it now, why we 9 should assume that there was a verdict, even 10 though state law tells us there wasn't. 11 To the contrary, you have to look to 12 the underlying state law to identify whether there is some final verdict or judicial order 13 14 that could even potentially terminate jeopardy 15 in the first place. And, here, because there's 16 no verdict, there's no termination of jeopardy, 17 then the Double Jeopardy Clause doesn't apply. 18 Now other states can have different 19 rules about verdicts, but I think that Georgia's 20 repugnancy rule, if anything, is the most 21 sensible way of responding to a very rare set of 2.2 circumstances. It's a generally pro-defendant 23 rule that ensures the parties obtain an actual determination of the critical facts. 24 25 critical fact of McElrath's sanity was not

- determined here. Therefore, he can be retried.
- I welcome the Court's questions.
- JUSTICE THOMAS: If you only had one
- 4 charge here, malice murder, would there have
- 5 been a verdict?
- 6 MR. PETRANY: Well, I suppose it
- 7 depends on what the jury comes back with --
- 9 MR. PETRANY: -- but yes.
- 10 JUSTICE THOMAS: -- everything is the
- 11 same except it's only one charge.
- MR. PETRANY: Yeah. In that case, you
- 13 would -- you would have a verdict, but --
- JUSTICE THOMAS: So, if that's -- if
- this constitutes a verdict if there were only
- one, why does it not constitute a verdict when
- 17 there are two?
- 18 MR. PETRANY: Because Georgia does not
- 19 ascribe to the legal fiction that the jury is
- 20 finding different facts when they're looking at
- 21 the exact same facts.
- JUSTICE THOMAS: No, that's not what
- 23 -- so you have a verdict. You say that if there
- 24 -- if it's only malice murder that we're
- 25 concerned about, that you would have a verdict

- 1 here.
- 2 MR. PETRANY: If that was -- yes, if
- 3 that was all that was in the case, if that was
- 4 the only thing going on, yeah, I don't see --
- 5 JUSTICE THOMAS: And just everything
- in the case is exactly the same, except there's
- 7 only one charge --
- 8 MR. PETRANY: Yeah.
- 9 JUSTICE THOMAS: -- would this
- 10 constitute a verdict?
- 11 MR. PETRANY: Yeah, I think, under
- 12 Georgia law as it exists today, that that would
- 13 be a verdict, yes.
- 14 JUSTICE THOMAS: So the problem is
- 15 that up to that point, until you void the
- 16 verdict, you have what constitutes a verdict.
- 17 It's not procedurally defective. There's not a
- 18 jurisdictional problem. You have a verdict that
- 19 is subsequently voided because it's inconsistent
- 20 with a separate charge.
- 21 And I don't know how you get around
- 22 the notion -- and that requires you, by the way,
- 23 to look at the substance of the verdict. And I
- don't know how you get around the notion that
- 25 before you can do that, there actually is a

1 verdict. 2 MR. PETRANY: Well, no, Your Honor, to 3 be clear, here, in this case, there was never a verdict because, again, the jury issued 4 5 something simultaneously. It said at the same time, speaking out of both sides of its mouth, 6 7 he's both sane and insane at the same time. 8 And these were special findings. As 9 we explain in our brief, there's a big distinction between a jury coming back with a --10 11 you know, a general verdict of not guilty, 12 which, you know, a jury has the authority to --13 to do that for any reason or no reason at all --14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How do you define 15 general verdict? Guilty, not guilty of both 16 counts? MR. PETRANY: Well, a general verdict 17 18 19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Obviously --20 MR. PETRANY: -- of not guilty just 21 says not guilty and you're done basically. And 22 it doesn't -- it doesn't go into any special 23 findings as to what the --

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JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The -- but the

only special finding here had to do with his --

- 1 with whether it was excusable because of mental
- 2 illness or because of insanity, correct?
- 3 MR. PETRANY: Yeah, the -- the special
- 4 findings in this case --
- 5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: It's not a special
- 6 finding with respect to the one charge that
- 7 changes any of the facts of the acquittal.
- 8 MR. PETRANY: Well, no, Your Honor,
- 9 the special finding is that he was insane. If
- 10 he had not been insane, he would have been
- 11 guilty.
- 12 JUSTICE JACKSON: But that wasn't the
- 13 question that was posed to the jury standing
- 14 alone. I mean, I understand your argument if
- you're saying the jury was asked is this person
- insane, and their answer was simply yes in one
- 17 situation with respect to one count and no with
- 18 respect to the other.
- But the jury was asked about the
- 20 elements of a particular crime and whether he
- 21 was guilty or not guilty. So their verdict was
- 22 not guilty by reason of insanity with respect to
- 23 one of them and guilty, right --
- MR. PETRANY: Well, Yes, Your Honor,
- 25 but --

JUSTICE JACKSON: -- with respect to 1 2 the other? 3 MR. PETRANY: -- but not quilty by reason of insanity by definition means that you 4 did commit the crime and the only reason that we 5 6 have said you're not guilty is because you are, 7 in fact, insane. JUSTICE JACKSON: I understand. 8 MR. PETRANY: And I think it's --9 JUSTICE JACKSON: But what do we do 10 11 with the not quilty part of it? I mean, the 12 jury was not asked a special -- on a special 13 verdict form just the pure question of insanity 14 in the way you sort of set it up at the 15 beginning. 16 MR. PETRANY: Well, actually, as a 17 practical matter, Your Honor, I think that --18 that they were. I mean, this -- even setting aside the -- the more mundane aspects of this 19 20 case where the entire trial was about sanity, they were given a special verdict form that has 21 2.2 four options. The judge did, in fact, instruct 23 them that they could say not guilty. They 24 always had that authority. 25 So it's not like Georgia is somehow

- 1 trying to force the jury into, you know, giving
- 2 up its general power to just say not guilty for
- 3 any reason. And part of the -- the reason that
- 4 we think this case is different from, you know,
- 5 the -- you know, the seemingly facially
- 6 inconsistent verdict cases is precisely because,
- 7 in this case, the jury didn't do that. It
- 8 actually made special determinations about
- 9 special --
- 10 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Counsel?
- MR. PETRANY: Yes.
- 12 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Just looking through
- the briefs, I didn't see another state that has
- 14 a scheme like Georgia's that allows an acquittal
- to be rendered invalid based on its repugnancy
- with other quilty verdicts. Is that correct?
- MR. PETRANY: As far as I'm aware,
- 18 there's no state that has addressed this
- 19 particular issue, Your Honor. I mean, these are
- 20 rare circumstances. It's not ordinary for a
- 21 jury to issue special findings on a particular
- 22 issue --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: I'm -- I'm -- I'm
- 24 just --
- 25 MR. PETRANY: -- going both ways, but,

1 yes --2 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- generally 3 speaking. 4 MR. PETRANY: -- you are -- as far as 5 I know, there's no --JUSTICE GORSUCH: This is it? 6 7 MR. PETRANY: -- other state that has addressed this issue at all. 8 9 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Now shouldn't that 10 tell us something? 11 (Laughter.) 12 JUSTICE GORSUCH: That 230 years in 13 this -- in this country's history, we have respected acquittals without looking into their 14 15 substance and without looking into how they fit 16 with other counts and said a jury is a check on 17 judges, it's a check on prosecutors, it's a 18 check on overreach, it's part of our democratic 19 system, and we do not ever talk about whether 20 they make sense to us. 21 They may be products of compromise. 2.2 They may be inconsistent with verdicts on other 23 counts. We don't question them. And this is 24 the first time this issue has arisen here.

Shouldn't that tell us something?

1 MR. PETRANY: I don't think so, Your 2 Honor. As we point out in our briefs, the fact 3 that Georgia has a different rule from other states -- and, again, I would hasten to add it's 4 not clear that the rule is different so much as 5 6 other states just haven't addressed this issue. 7 In a lot of states, you might not have the same sort of defenses or states of mind that 8 9 would so easily come into conflict, although, 10 again, here, I think this is a rare 11 circumstance. 12 But, to get to your point, absolutely, a jury's general verdict of acquittal is one of 13 14 the most sacrosanct things in American 15 constitutional law, and we're not trying to 16 undermine that at all. 17 But I do think it's important to point out that that's simply not what happened here. 18 19 They had the option to do that, and, instead, 20 they gave completely contradictory answers about 21 a single factual question. 2.2 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, and -- and 23 that raises the question about Missouri's brief, 24 for example, and their concern seems to be

within a single count that some states do that,

- 1 the case I had, you know, where you just
- 2 couldn't tell what the jury's verdict was on a
- 3 count and send the jury back to figure it out.
- 4 None of that's at stake here, right?
- 5 MR. PETRANY: Well, I think the
- 6 principle of the matter arguably extends there.
- 7 I mean, I --
- 8 JUSTICE GORSUCH: You'd have to extend
- 9 it. But it isn't at issue here?
- 10 MR. PETRANY: Well, I think -- I think
- 11 the logic is the same. The only difference
- 12 between here and --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: No, the logic isn't
- 14 the same. I mean, I'm sorry, I just have to
- 15 reject that. Assume I disagree with that.
- MR. PETRANY: Okay.
- 17 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Because the logic
- 18 for 230 years is a verdict on a count is
- 19 sacrosanct, okay?
- Here, we're dealing with not -- not
- 21 two counts, we're dealing with one count, and we
- 22 cannot tell what the jury did. The judge
- doesn't know what to do. He doesn't have his
- 24 instructions from the jury.
- 25 MR. PETRANY: Well, Your Honor, I want

- 1 to be clear about the 230 years. Every time the
- 2 Court has talked about this and every time the
- 3 Court has made rulings about this, it's always
- 4 talking about a general verdict of acquittal.
- 5 It's not talking about a circumstance
- 6 where you have special findings that did not
- 7 have the same sort of status, the same sort of
- 8 --
- 9 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Why does that make a
- 10 difference? An acquittal is an acquittal is an
- 11 acquittal --
- 12 MR. PETRANY: Oh, I think it makes --
- 13 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- since time
- immemorial. Now you're telling us an acquittal
- isn't an acquittal if it's a special verdict
- 16 form?
- MR. PETRANY: No, what I'm saying is
- it's not an acquittal if the jury did not, in
- 19 fact, resolve the factual question that
- 20 supposedly underlies that acquittal. And in
- 21 this particular case, we know because they said
- 22 two contradictory things that they didn't, in
- 23 fact, resolve that particular factual point.
- 24 JUSTICE GORSUCH: We also know that
- 25 the jury was polled. They stood by this

- 1 verdict. We know that there were no objections
- 2 contemporaneously by Georgia prosecutors. And I
- 3 think we also know that the attorney general at
- 4 least below said that acquittal is an acquittal.
- 5 MR. PETRANY: Well, no. What the
- 6 attorney -- well, what the brief below said --
- 7 and it was a tangential footnote that really
- 8 wasn't getting into the issue -- is that where
- 9 there's an acquittal, double jeopardy applies.
- 10 And we're not contesting that at all, much like
- 11 McElrath here today and throughout his briefing
- 12 sort of assumed --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: I thought the
- 14 attorney general said that retrying Petitioner
- on the murder count would, of course, violate
- 16 double jeopardy.
- MR. PETRANY: Assume -- yeah, on the
- 18 basis that there was an acquittal. But that
- 19 brief didn't really get into that issue. And
- 20 the primary brief in the case, the DA brief, did
- 21 reject that particular position.
- What I'd also say, going back to,
- 23 well, did Georgia, you know, have a problem with
- 24 this at the time, well, no, because Georgia
- 25 wanted everything to stay the way it was, of

- 1 course.
- 2 From Georgia's perspective, from the
- 3 prosecution's perspective, it was -- it got what
- 4 it wanted, right? There was, in fact, a -- you
- 5 know, in -- in its -- to the extent that you
- 6 accept these as verdicts, to the extent you
- 7 don't accept Georgia's repugnancy rule, McElrath
- 8 would be in prison for life.
- 9 So the only -- the only one who had an
- incentive to challenge this was McElrath, and he
- 11 did, and his theory was --
- 12 JUSTICE GORSUCH: It's not unusual --
- MR. PETRANY: -- well, these are
- 14 repugnant verdicts.
- 15 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- for a defendant
- 16 to -- to challenge the guilty verdicts.
- 17 MR. PETRANY: Oh, absolutely. I'm not
- 18 -- I'm not --
- 19 JUSTICE GORSUCH: I mean, that's what
- 20 appeals all are about. Are you saying -- I
- 21 mean, maybe you can get rid of the repugnancy
- 22 rule allowing him to say that the guilty
- verdicts are repugnant given the acquittal, but
- I don't see how it works the other way around.
- MR. PETRANY: Well, the point is that

- 1 his theory was a Georgia rule that as the
- 2 Georgia Supreme Court, the highest arbiter of
- 3 Georgia law says, says there's no verdict at
- 4 all. That's the theory behind this rule. And
- 5 if there is a verdict, the rule doesn't really
- 6 make sense anymore.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: But, General, before
- 8 our inconsistency cases, there might have been a
- 9 lawyer standing where you were saying our state
- 10 has decided that when a jury comes back with two
- inconsistent verdicts, we're going to say that
- there's no verdict at all because, after all,
- 13 how can there be a verdict if there's
- 14 inconsistency.
- 15 And you are saying that there's -- and
- 16 we rejected that out of hand and in numerous
- 17 cases. So you're saying that there's a
- 18 difference between that and this repugnancy
- 19 situation. I quess I just don't understand what
- 20 it is, so could you explain it to me a little
- 21 bit more?
- MR. PETRANY: Yes, Your Honor. The
- 23 first point that I would make is that all of
- 24 those inconsistent verdicts cases assume that
- 25 there are verdicts to begin with. In none of

- 1 them was the Court looking at, well, was there a
- 2 --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: But -- but is --
- 4 but -- but, again, a lawyer could have come up
- 5 here and say, as a matter of state law, we're
- 6 going to just say that there's not a verdict
- 7 when the verdict is -- when the supposed verdict
- 8 is inconsistent with another one.
- 9 MR. PETRANY: No, I --
- 10 JUSTICE KAGAN: So, you know, the
- 11 State could have made the exact same argument.
- 12 And, surely, we decided against that argument --
- MR. PETRANY: Well --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: -- when we -- when we
- 15 had -- when we decided those cases.
- MR. PETRANY: Well, my point was
- 17 simply that no one was making that argument.
- 18 Powell itself, the paradigm case on this --
- 19 JUSTICE KAGAN: If somebody had been
- 20 making that argument, surely, we would have --
- 21 MR. PETRANY: Yes, I think you would
- 22 have, but I think the reason that you would have
- 23 -- and I think that this Court has said this --
- it said it in Smith, it's -- last year, it's
- 25 said it elsewhere -- is that there's something

- 1 special about a general verdict of not quilty.
- 2 It said this in Powell.
- 3 This is something that goes back
- 4 hundreds of years, that a jury's authority to
- 5 say not guilty even if we believe that he is, in
- fact, guilty is something that goes, you know,
- 7 prior to the founding and beyond, and this Court
- 8 --
- 9 JUSTICE KAGAN: I mean, it seems --
- 10 JUSTICE BARRETT: But even if --
- 11 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- to me that it's
- 12 the -- the exact same thing really. I mean,
- when -- when a jury comes back with inconsistent
- verdicts, we don't really know what happened. I
- mean, one possibility of what happened is the
- 16 jury made a humdinger of a mistake.
- 17 And another possibility of what
- happened is that the jury made no mistake at all
- 19 but instead decided to compromise something out
- or decided to show leniency of a kind that it is
- 21 within the right of a jury to show. And so too
- 22 here, the jury might have made a humdinger of a
- 23 mistake in the way that you're suggesting, but,
- in addition, the jury might have decided to
- 25 compromise things out or to show leniency.

1 And in that sense, we would be 2 intruding into the jury's deliberations as much 3 in your case as in the inconsistency cases, if we adopted your rule. 4 MR. PETRANY: No, and the reason I 5 6 don't think that that's true, Justice Kagan, is 7 when a jury issues a verdict of -- a general verdict of not quilty, you don't know what the 8 9 jury did, and you can't look into why. Here, 10 you still aren't going to look into why, but 11 they told you what they did. They said we found 12 him both guilty -- or, sorry, both sane and 13 insane. 14 And so it's just a very different 15 thing. We're not hunting for some sort of 16 internal thoughts of the jury or something like that. We have in front of us two different 17 18 things that the jury said about the same 19 question. JUSTICE JACKSON: But, if --20 21 JUSTICE KAGAN: We found him both sane 2.2 on one count and insane on the another count, 23 one of which led to a guilty verdict and the other of which led to an acquittal because --24 25 let's imagine -- we wanted to compromise.

- 1 the exact same thing that you're asking us to
- 2 look into, which we have always said we will not
- 3 look into.
- 4 MR. PETRANY: Well, I disagree,
- 5 Justice Kagan, because I think in the -- in the
- 6 case of a general verdict of not guilty, as this
- 7 Court has said many times over the years, and,
- 8 again, even pre-founding, there's something
- 9 special about that authority, as this Court has
- 10 said, for instance, in Gaudin, a case that we
- 11 cite, courts by the time of the founding
- 12 couldn't force juries to issue special findings
- 13 precisely because there was something special
- 14 about this general verdict of not guilty. It
- 15 allowed the jury the space to say you are not
- 16 quilty and we're not going to tell you why.
- 17 But in this circumstance, although the
- 18 jury had the authority to do that, was
- instructed on doing that, they didn't do that.
- Instead, they came out and said: We think he's
- 21 sane and insane at the same time.
- So I do think that that's a -- that's
- 23 a fundamentally different, you know, issue from
- 24 the jury. And I think when a court looks at
- 25 that and says factually you've decided the same

- 1 issue in two different ways, I think it is a bit
- 2 legally fictitious to say: Well, they were
- 3 really deciding two different factual issues.
- I mean, I know it's at least a little
- 5 bit legally fictitious because, you know, this
- 6 Court, you know, applies collateral estoppel
- 7 rules to jury findings on a particular count.
- 8 So we all acknowledge that there really is one
- 9 fact that's being decided here, which is his
- insanity at the time of the crime, and the jury
- 11 said yes and no.
- 12 And just -- just to give one example
- of why I think McElrath's argument here is -- is
- 14 a little bit formalistic, suppose the jury form
- were slightly different and suppose it had an
- option for guilt and then it had a different
- option for insanity. And they said guilty on
- 18 all counts on insanity -- or on -- on the guilt
- 19 question, but then on insanity, they said yes
- 20 and no. I mean, that's -- that's the same
- 21 circumstance that we're in here. It's -- it's
- 22 not fundamentally different. It's a jury not
- 23 actually deciding whether or not they have come
- 24 to a conclusion.
- 25 JUSTICE BARRETT: General, are you

- 1 saying that you can never have plainly 2 inconsistent general verdicts? 3 MR. PETRANY: As a factual --JUSTICE BARRETT: Are you just saying 4 I mean, because it kind of sounds like --5 6 MR. PETRANY: Yes, as a factual -- as 7 a factual matter, yes, I actually think that's true because you could never know -- the jury 8 9 might have just said yeah, the -- you're --10 you're guilty as sin, all the facts are there, 11 but we don't care; we're going to say not guilty 12 any way. 13 So you can never know that what they 14 did was factually inconsistent. They might have 15 just said yeah, you did it all, but we're going 16 to let you off on this particular count. So I 17 think it's just a matter of -- of logic, you can 18 never know that two general verdicts are 19 absolutely inconsistent with one another. 20 That's why in our brief we refer to it as kind 21 of seemingly inconsistent, but because the jury 2.2 could be deciding this on a totally non-factual
- 25 JUSTICE JACKSON: But wasn't Justice

basis, you can't know that they're actually

23

24

inconsistent.

- 1 Gorsuch's point that even if we know that they
- 2 are inconsistent, so what? I mean, the point is
- 3 that we've said a jury can issue inconsistent
- 4 verdicts. So your -- your argument seems to be,
- 5 well, there's -- the distinction that Justice
- 6 Kagan was asking you about is that in one
- 7 situation, we don't know it's inconsistent, and
- 8 in another situation, this situation, we do
- 9 know.
- 10 Okay. I mean, fine. So it's
- 11 inconsistent. Why -- why does that mean that
- 12 the court gets to say you are able to do that,
- jury? You know, you can retry this person or
- 14 you have to set it up so he can be retried
- because that's not a valid thing for the jury to
- 16 do.
- 17 MR. PETRANY: Well, two points, Your
- 18 Honor. The first is it's not -- you know, I'm
- 19 not speaking from nothing when I say that the
- 20 inconsistent verdicts cases are different
- 21 because we don't know what the jury has done.
- This is what the Court has said. We don't know
- 23 what the jury has done.
- 24 But the second reason is, I think the
- 25 reason that the jury can issue a verdict of not

- 1 guilty, a general verdict of not guilty, and a
- 2 state can't say, oh, that's not really a
- 3 verdict, because it may or may not be
- 4 inconsistent with this other one, is because of
- 5 the right to a jury trial and the fact that, as
- 6 this Court has explained on numerous occasions,
- 7 a jury always has that authority. A state can't
- 8 say you don't have the authority to issue this
- 9 general verdict of not guilty.
- 10 And we cite several things in our
- 11 brief, I don't think McElrath even denies --
- 12 JUSTICE JACKSON: I guess my --
- MR. PETRANY: -- that with special
- 14 verdicts --
- 15 JUSTICE JACKSON: I -- I quess my
- 16 question is why is it -- and I think your
- 17 argument is turning on this -- that a state can
- 18 tell the jury they have to be factually
- 19 consistent? So even if I accept your
- 20 distinction that you are drawing with Justice
- 21 Kagan in that -- you know, in this particular
- 22 world, we have evidence that there's a factual
- 23 inconsistency with respect to the way they
- rendered their verdicts, why is it okay for the
- 25 state to say you can't do that?

1 MR. PETRANY: Again, two points, Your 2 The first is I think that, as a matter 3 of sensibility, the jury is supposed to find facts. If they don't find the facts, if they 4 instead tell you two opposite things, it makes a 5 lot of sense to say the jury has not, in fact, 6 7 found this fact. But the second one I would say is it's 8 9 McElrath's burden to identify why a state can't 10 do this. It is the strong presumption that a 11 state does have authority over its own criminal 12 laws and procedures. And unless there's 13 something in the, you know, kind of fundamental 14 right to a jury trial or something like a this 15 JUSTICE JACKSON: Isn't it the 16 17 Constitution? I mean, I thought -- I guess my question is isn't there -- isn't this a matter 18 19 of federal law as to whether or not what is happening here is an acquittal or not an 20 21 acquittal for the purpose of the Double Jeopardy 2.2 Clause? 23 MR. PETRANY: So what a state order or 24 finding or something like that, the effect that

it has for the purposes of double jeopardy is

- 1 ultimately a federal question. But what the
- 2 state order is and whether it exists in the
- 3 first place, that's not necessarily a federal
- 4 question. And I would point the Court to Smith
- 5 versus Massachusetts and Sattazahn versus
- 6 Pennsylvania.
- 7 In Smith versus Massachusetts, the
- 8 Court did hold that this mid-trial judicial
- 9 acquittal triggered the Double Jeopardy Clause,
- 10 but it said if Massachusetts had a rule that
- 11 this wasn't a final order, that it could be
- 12 revisited, that they could back to it later,
- well, then it wouldn't trigger double jeopardy.
- 14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, so what
- if the state had a rule that the foreman has to
- 16 sign the verdict in blue ink, all right? And he
- 17 signed it in -- in black ink, and the judge --
- 18 you know, it's supposed to be blue ink; go back.
- 19 He goes back and then one of the jurors changes
- 20 their mind. Is that rule of state law
- 21 sufficient to constitute a determination of when
- jeopardy was terminated?
- MR. PETRANY: Yeah, I think if -- if
- 24 the state has a whole --
- 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You think it

- 1 is?
- 2 MR. PETRANY: Yeah. I think if the
- 3 state has a procedural rule that has to be
- 4 complied with, and by the time that it was
- 5 complied with, the jury has -- is not unanimous,
- 6 I think the general presumption would be yes,
- 7 it's fine. If there's -- if there's something
- 8 about that that --
- 9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You wouldn't
- 10 think that that's a -- whatever, a frivolous
- 11 rule that shouldn't impede the federal law
- 12 determination?
- MR. PETRANY: So -- well, this is what
- I was going to say, Your Honor. As this Court
- 15 has -- has said many times in many contexts,
- 16 whether it be property or, last year, in the
- 17 Elections Clause, you know, at some point, if a
- 18 state -- if a state rule is so outside the
- 19 bounds of kind of normal reasonable legislation
- or -- or adjudication, then you might say, well,
- 21 you're just evading, you know, some federal
- 22 right here. So in the property context, you
- 23 can't just redefine a taking --
- 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I
- 25 suppose --

1 MR. PETRANY: -- via tax or something 2 like that. Right. 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: MR. PETRANY: But the presumption 4 would be, you know, the state is allowed to do 5 6 this unless there's some way in when it's 7 evading federal constitutional guarantees. 8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, and I 9 guess the argument would be, even in the context 10 of your understanding, that it's the only state 11 that has done this in 230 years, and maybe 12 that's outside the normal understanding. MR. PETRANY: Yeah, so that is -- at 13 14 the very least, that's the right kind of 15 argument that McElrath should be making here, 16 but the reason I reject that is because, first of all, I don't -- I don't accept the notion 17 18 that no other state has ever had a rule anything 19 like this. 20 It's true that no other state appears 21 to have actually come across facts exactly like 2.2 this, but we point to examples in our brief, and 23 the Missouri amicus brief has others of kind of similar situations, where they do, in fact, have 24 rules that appear at least similar or analogous 25

- 1 to -- to our rule here.
- 2 And we also point to cases, like in
- 3 the Morgan article, from before the founding
- 4 where -- where cases -- especially where special
- 5 verdicts seems to be inconsistent with even
- 6 general verdicts of --
- 7 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: You -- you hang a
- 8 lot on the special findings being different from
- 9 a general verdict, but couldn't the inconsistent
- or repugnant special findings be the product of
- 11 compromise or leniency?
- MR. PETRANY: Well, I think that this
- goes back to my answer to Justice Kagan earlier,
- which is we don't look behind what the jury did
- 15 to sort of understand their motivation. So they
- issued special verdicts that are completely
- incomprehensible when put together.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: But they could --
- 19 couldn't they be the product -- I guess, to go
- 20 back to my question, couldn't they be the
- 21 product of compromise or leniency?
- MR. PETRANY: They could have -- I
- 23 mean, what the jury did, I have no idea. I
- 24 wasn't in the room. And that's kind of the
- 25 point.

1 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: But it -- but it 2 could be compromise? 3 MR. PETRANY: It's at least theoretically possible that the -- the -- the 4 jury wanted to do something like be lenient or 5 something like this. But the reason that a 6 7 general verdict is so different --8 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Or -- or 9 compromise, right? 10 Yeah, although I don't MR. PETRANY: 11 take the court's -- I don't take the court's 12 mention of compromise in the inconsistent 13 verdicts cases to be sort of blessing that as 14 something that's like good for a jury to be 15 doing necessarily. It's just you can't tell. 16 They could have done any number of things. 17 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, the founders 18 certainly thought it was important. And, you 19 know, go back to the trial of John Zenger, he 20 was guilty as heck and yet the jury acquitted 21 him and that was considered one of the great 2.2 moments in American history leading up to the 23 adoption of -- of the Seventh Amendment. 24 And so I guess Justice Kavanaugh and I 25 think Justice Kagan have put their finger on it.

- 1 The minute you admit that it could be a product
- of leniency or compromise, we're done, aren't
- 3 we?
- 4 MR. PETRANY: Well, Your Honor --
- 5 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Because then -- then
- 6 we have to respect that verdict regardless of
- 7 whether we think it's rational or what we would
- 8 do. It's supposed to be a check on -- on us
- 9 judges and you prosecutors.
- 10 MR. PETRANY: Your Honor, prior to the
- founding, there was a period of time when courts
- would try to sort of corral juries by forcing
- 13 them to issue special verdicts.
- 14 And what came out of this was that the
- way we were going to make sure your right to a
- jury trial is always a check on the executive,
- 17 the legislative, whoever else, is by making sure
- 18 you can always get a general verdict of not
- 19 quilty.
- 20 JUSTICE GORSUCH: All right. I -- I
- 21 -- I --
- MR. PETRANY: So that's how I would --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- I guess if you'd
- 24 answered the -- the question, though. The
- 25 moment you admit that you are -- that that

- 1 verdict could be a product of compromise or
- leniency, why isn't that the end of the game?
- 3 MR. PETRANY: Because I don't think
- 4 that the jury necessarily -- I don't think the
- 5 right to a jury trial includes the right for the
- 6 jury to try to issue completely incomprehensible
- 7 special findings to sort of game out what
- 8 they're doing. So, in this case, for instance,
- 9 --
- 10 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Or -- or is it
- 11 really you're saying that the jury doesn't have
- 12 a right to do leniency and compromise?
- MR. PETRANY: No, Your Honor, they
- obviously do and they could have in this case
- with a general verdict of not guilty. But, to
- 16 be clear, when they issued this, you know,
- 17 purported verdict, assume you accept it, it has
- 18 consequences for McElrath.
- 19 So the -- the idea that the jury can,
- 20 you know, can consign him to a mental health
- 21 hospital until he is, you know, determined not
- to be dangerous anymore as sort of some version
- of leniency I think is getting way outside of
- 24 the ordinary general verdict of not guilty is
- 25 the jury's ultimate --

1	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I'm
2	not that's one thing that, well, I'm
3	interested in your view on. You seem to say
4	this is different than inconsistent verdicts,
5	which could be explained by juror compromise,
6	leniency, whatever.
7	I don't know why the same thing
8	doesn't apply to repugnant verdicts. I don't
9	know that the jury necessarily would be as
10	sophisticated as counsel today in explaining
11	what's a repugnant verdict versus what's an
12	inconsistent verdict. And after back and forth,
13	they might just it might be compromise.
14	Okay, we're going to say he's sane for
15	this and and guilty, he's not guilty by
16	reason of sanity, you know, this group is fine
17	with one, that group is fine with another.
18	I don't know that they thrashed
19	through the law about whether they would have to
20	be reconciled or not.
21	MR. PETRANY: Yeah, Your Honor, I
22	think that the reason a general verdict of not
23	guilty is different is because of leniency. I
24	don't think that a state is powerless to
25	hasically say no you're not allowed to like

- 1 compromise by coming to completely
- 2 incomprehensible conclusions.
- I do think a state is prohibited from
- 4 keeping a jury from issuing a general verdict of
- 5 not guilty because of the jury's historic
- 6 function as a check on the executive. And I
- 7 think, in this case, the jury had the authority
- 8 to do that. It had the power to do that. It
- 9 chose not to do that. Instead, it issued
- 10 special findings that nobody knows necessarily
- 11 the motivation, the internal motivation of the
- 12 jury for that. But what we know is what they
- 13 actually did.
- 14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I -- you keep
- 15 talking about general and special verdicts, and
- 16 having tried so many cases, I think of special
- 17 verdicts as verdicts where you ask each element
- of the offense separately and then you come to
- 19 the judge then decides whether that's a guilty
- 20 or not guilty.
- 21 A general verdict is, are you guilty
- 22 or not guilty but based on the elements -- based
- on whatever special defenses. And almost always
- 24 you had is he quilty by reason of insanity or
- 25 not? That's what they did here, right, on the

- 1 malice murder?
- 2 MR. PETRANY: It was not not guilty by
- 3 reason of insanity, yes.
- 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Right. They
- 5 didn't ask did he have malice, the intent to
- 6 kill, did he kill this person, did he do -- they
- 7 just said is he guilty by reason of insanity or
- 8 guilty but with mental illness, correct, and
- 9 they just checked off which of the elements were
- 10 --
- MR. PETRANY: Yeah, they had -- yes,
- 12 they had four options.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. So, in
- 14 Smith last year, we said an acquittal takes
- 15 place when there is a merits-related
- 16 "resolution," correct or not, "of some or all of
- 17 the factual elements of the crime charged."
- 18 Here, the jury was given malice
- 19 murder. Some of the facts -- one of the factual
- 20 elements is the mental state, guilty by reason
- of insanity or not, they said not. I don't know
- 22 how this doesn't fit Smith's definition of what
- 23 an acquittal is.
- 24 You want to call it a general verdict.
- 25 But Smith said, all we're looking at is what the

- 1 jury did. And the jury said not guilty by
- 2 reason of insanity. You told Justice Thomas
- 3 that if it just stood alone that way, jeopardy
- 4 attached.
- 5 I still don't understand how you
- 6 unattach it simply because there's a second
- 7 charge with a potential inconsistency that you
- 8 now admit could have been by reason of jury
- 9 compromise.
- 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Briefly,
- 11 counsel.
- 12 MR. PETRANY: Yeah, Your Honor, I
- don't think states are prohibited from trying to
- 14 avoid incomprehensible compromises. I think
- it's just leniency that they have to leave in
- there with general verdicts of not guilty.
- 17 As far as whether this is a special
- 18 verdict or not, the Georgia Supreme Court
- 19 understood it that way. McElrath understood it
- 20 that way. You know, that was the basis of his
- 21 argument all the way along, including in his
- 22 plea and bar in this case.
- 23 And so the big difference ultimately
- 24 is that the jury always has the authority to
- just say not guilty, we don't want you to be

- 1 guilty of this crime. I don't think there's any
- 2 historical or other support for the idea that a
- 3 jury must have the authority to issue
- 4 incomprehensible special findings.
- 5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
- 6 counsel.
- 7 Rebuttal, Mr. Simpson?
- 8 Oh, I'm sorry, I'm sorry, we skipped
- 9 the --
- 10 (Laughter.)
- 11 MR. SIMPSON: I'm ready to jump in.
- 12 (Laughter.)
- 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yeah. Excuse
- 14 me. Anything further, Justice Alito?
- 15 (Laughter.)
- 16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice?
- 17 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: I -- I do --
- 18 I do have some further. Sorry.
- 19 (Laughter.)
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: If you do not
- 21 prevail in this case, I have two questions. One
- is, can't Georgia going forward solve the
- 23 problem that you've identified by simply saying
- 24 that the quilty verdicts stand even if
- 25 repugnant?

- MR. PETRANY: Yes. 1 So, if we were to 2 lose this case, I think not only could they, but 3 that is the only logical thing for the Georgia Supreme Court to do because the basis of this 4 rule was there are no verdicts at all. 5 Georgia accepts the basic idea that if 6 7 -- if these are seemingly inconsistent, we'll just -- we'll just accept them as they are. 8 The basis for this rule was we don't 9 think these are verdicts at all. If this Court 10 11 says, yeah, they are, then I think basically 12 whether McElrath or the next person in his shoes is just going to be stuck with the 13 14 life-in-prison conviction. 15 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Is that still 16 possible in this case? 17 MR. PETRANY: Yes, I think so. 18 mean, obviously, it's going to be up to the
- 19 Georgia Supreme Court to figure out what to do
- 20 going forward, but the initial decision was
- 21 based on the idea that there was no verdict
- here.
- 23 And so, if this Court were to vacate
- and remand and say, no, there was a verdict
- 25 here, then we -- presumably, the Georgia Supreme

- 1 Court would at least take seriously the argument
- of, okay, well, then we just reinstate the
- 3 judgment because the United States Supreme Court
- 4 just said there was a verdict.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Thank you.
- 6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 7 Barrett?
- 8 Justice Jackson?
- 9 Thank you, counsel.
- 10 Mr. Simpson, rebuttal.
- 11 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF RICHARD A. SIMPSON
- 12 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
- MR. SIMPSON: Mr. Chief Justice, and
- 14 may it please the Court:
- Justice Thomas, you're exactly right
- that under Georgia law each of these counts, if
- it had been charged separately, at -- at the
- 18 verdict would be a final verdict under state
- 19 law. It's only by comparison them -- comparing
- them that you get to repugnancy.
- 21 It is true that Mr. McElrath appealed
- 22 in this case. He had the right to do that under
- 23 Georgia law. And going to Justice Kavanaugh's
- 24 question, under Powell, states may, as the
- 25 federal government does, when there are

- 1 inconsistent acquittals and convictions, may
- 2 allow the conviction to stand. They can't touch
- 3 the appeal.
- It's "may," not "must." Many states
- 5 throw out the conviction. It's a state choice
- 6 at that level.
- 7 And there was -- the -- the Georgia
- 8 Supreme Court in the Turner case in 2006, I
- 9 believe, dealt with what it had said was is
- 10 repugnant verdicts, and it did exactly that. It
- 11 let the acquittal stand, but it vacated the --
- 12 threw out the conviction. We would hope that
- 13 Georgia would continue to follow that rule. It
- 14 will be its decision, but there's nothing about
- 15 a decision by this Court that would require
- 16 Georgia to change its rule. And in the -- in
- 17 the context of Turner, it reached exactly the
- 18 result of allowing the -- the acquittal to stand
- 19 and throwing out the conviction.
- 20 In -- in terms of repugnancy, I think
- 21 the key point, as the questions indicated, there
- 22 really isn't a principal difference. Here Mr.
- 23 McElrath was acquitted of the most serious
- 24 charge, convicted of the lesser charge. Could
- have been leniency, could have been compromise.

т	we don't know why the court reached I in
2	sorry, the jury reached that verdict.
3	And then, finally, the reference to
4	issue preclusion where there's a conviction and
5	an acquittal. This Court has held there's
6	that issue preclusion is not mandatory. So,
7	again, Georgia may but it is not required to.
8	Unless there are additional questions
9	I would yield the remainder of my time.
10	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
11	counsel.
12	The case is submitted.
13	(Whereupon, at 11:03 a.m., the case
14	was submitted.)
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